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ABSTRACT
The present investigati6n explored the effects of
personal control (skill instruction), no personal control (chance instruction), success," and "failure" as
independent variables in a task situation which might
influence a change in subjects• control orientations.
70 college subjects were randomly assigned to one of six
experimental groups and a control group, and were tested
for their locus of control orientations on the Rotter
I-E scale both before and after participation in an original task situation and answering additional rating
questions. Results indicate that significant interac··
tive effects existed between locus of control orientation
and successful task performance in task situations with
varying amounts of personal control. The study also revealed that subjects who were told that the task was one
of skill ra~ed the task accordingly, and of these subjects only those who "failed" significantly changed their
ratings to indicate that more chance was involved. Conversely, subjects who were told that the task was one of
chance initially rated the task accordingly, and of these
subjects only those who "succeeded" significantly changed
their ratings to indicate that more· skill was involved.
It was also found that skill oriented subjects attached
a significantly greater importance to doing well on the
task than those chance oriented. Results were discussed
in view of several "within the design" issues which shed
light on limitations and strengths of the investigation,
and suggestions for further research in this particular
and timely area were given. It was concluded that the
present study establishes itself as an important link in
the chain of research on I-E control modification by its
substantiation of factors involved in effecting such orientation change. It was further concluded that the results carry implications for areas having a direct influence on individuals' lives such as psychotherapies,
school settings, minority and disadvantaged groups, and
work settings.
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A. INTRODUCTION

The modification of locus of control orientations appears to be one area within the massive amount of research
on the locus of control construct which has received relatively little attention.

The purpose of the present inves-

tigation is to examine variables suggested in the research
which may be influencial in effecting changes in individuals'
control orientations.

While the factors underlying such

change appear related to experiences of situations in which
one has or does not have personal control, the experiences
of success or failure in, or independent of, those situations
may also be important factors.
The validity and usefulness of the locus of control
construct in personality research appears well founded.
The bulk of

stud~es

examining various aspects of the con-

struct is tremendous.

Reviews (Joe, 1971; Lefcourt, 1966,

1972; Rotter, 1966, 1975) and bibliographies (Prociuk and
Lussier, 1975; Thornhill, Thornhill, and Youngman, 1975;
Throop and MacDonald, 1971), historic and current, are readily·available and attest to the continuous growth of research
in this area.
of

book~

In addition, there is an increasing number

on the topic (Lefcourt, 1976; Phares, 1973, 1976,

in press).

Rotter (1975) aptly speculates that popularity

and interest in the locus of control concept as a subject
for psychological investigations must surely be related to
some persistent social problems, these in turn being related to tremendous increases in population, societal com-
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plexities, and the subsequent powerlessness felt by and
permeating all levels of Western culture.
The locus of control construct is a conception of the
nature and effects of reinforcement which derives its theoretical background from social learning theory (Rotter,

1954).

Though an integral part of social learning theory,·

Lefcourt (1972) and Rotter (1975) caution researchers that
the locus of control concept is not the major or central
concept in that theory.

Actually, social learning theory

involves four classes of variables noted as behaviors, expectancies, reinforcements, and psychological situations.
These compile a behavioral prediction formula which, in its
basic form, states that the potential for a behavior to occur in any specific psychological situation is a function
of the expectancy, that the behavior will lead to a particular reinforcement in that situation and the value of that
reinforcement.(Rotter, 1975).

The locus of control concept

thus is but one element of a behavioral prediction formula
which also includes reinforcement value and situational determinants.

Lefcourt cautions further that research using

only locus of control as a predictor of certain criteria
would therefore be limited in making high magnitude relationships.
Rotter (1975) states that interest in a variable of
reinforcement control developed from persistent observations that increments and decrements in expectancies following reinforcement appeared to vary systematically, de-

.J

pending on the nature of the situation and also as a consistent characteristic of the particular individual who was
being reinforced.

Restated, there was interest in a vari-

able that might lead to corrected or refined predictions
of how reinforcements change expectancies; although other
aspects of reinforcements such as their positive or

nega~'

tive nature, their past history, .sequence, and patterning,
and their attached value are obviously important and pert::

haps more crucial behavioral determinants.
Specifically, the locus of control construct refers
to the degree to which individuals perceive events in their
lives as being a consequence of their own actions, and
thereby controllable, or as being unrelated to their own
behaviors and therefore beyond personal control.

Rotter

(1966) explains ,that when a reinforcement is perceived by
the subject as following some action of his own but not
being entirely contingent upon his action then, in our
culture, it is typically perceived as the result of luck,
chance, fate, as under the control of powerful others, or
as unpredictable because of the complexity of the forces
surrounding him.

Such an interpretation of events would

be labeled as a belief in external control.

However, if

the person perceives that the event is contingent upon his
own behavior or his own relatively permanent characteristics, such would be termed as a belief in internal control.
Rotter states that depending on one's history of reinforcement it seems likely that persons would differ in the degree
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to which they attributed reinforcements to their own actions, and also that reinforcement expectancies would generalize from a specific situation to a series of situations
which are perceived as related or similar.

In clarifying

this notion of generality Rotter (1975) states that this
does not mean expectancies will be:. the·. same. in. similar si 'tua tions, but that the changes in expectancies in one situation will have some small effect in changing expectancies
in the other.
This notion of the generalization and modifiability
of individuais• expectations of reinforcement control is
a central premise of the current investigation.

Follow-

ing from this notion an examination of factors that would
effect such change in control orientations would seem tenable, and therefore is the primary interest of this study.
Because change in individuals' locus of control orientations is to be under investigation here, an important
distinction should be made in the way the locus of control
construct is understood.

Although expectancies may lie

somewhere on an internal-external continuum, this does not
imply that control orientation is a personality trait or
typology~

Indeed, this view might easily be inferred upon

examining the mass of locus of control literature which delineates individuals as internals or externals with subsequently fixed characteristics applicable to that identity.
Lefcourt (1976) attempts to dispel the trait or typological perception of locus.of eontrol by stating that such is
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not a characteristic to be discovered within individuals.
Rather, if the position were adopted that individuals do
not have locus of control traits, as if they could possess
them, but instead were understood as constructing interpretations of events, some of which pertain to causality, it
would be easier to accept both stability and change in
these constructions.

According to Lefcourt, if locus of

control were thought to be a trait, consistent and inherent
in the person observed, then evidence regarding change
would logically lead one to question the very legitimacy
of the locus.of control construct.
As concerns change in, ,or modification of, individuals' locus of control orientation there are several important studies appearing in the literature to date. Studies presented here, while providing strong evidence of the
modifiability of control orientations, even more importantly suggest variables seemingly responsible for such
change,
Two studies report interesting findings relating age
and internal-external control orientations.

Penk (1969)

found chronological and mental age to be positively correlated with internality as measured by Bialer's locus of
control scale.

Penk' s finding that older children were ·

more internal than younger ones was a partial replication
of a study by Dialer (1961) who went a step further and
differentiated the relationship between mental age, chronological age, and locus .of control.

When Bialer partialled
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out mental age as determined by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test he found that the relationship between chronological age and locus of control lessened substantially,
whereas mental age and locus of control remained strongly
related when chronological age was partialled out.

Lef-

court (1976) speculates that had Fenk examined the pattern
of his results for effects deriving from partialling procedures, he may have had findings similar to Bialer•s.
Lefcourt further concludes from these two studies that
chronological age per se is not the most salient aspect
of maturation with respect to locus of control but that
the growth of mental age, the development of vocabulary
and its useage, becomes associated with a sense of being
able to determine the shape of one's life.
In an earlier review Lefcourt (1972) cites an unpublished doctoral dissertation by Kiehlbauch (1968) as finding that inmates in a reformatory acknowleged higher externali ty upon admission and just prior to release as compared to greater internality during the interim of their
stay.

In that review Lefcourt suggests that initial com-

mitment and final release are times of great uncertainty
and helplessness in terms of coping.

The intermediate

period of interlli!lent, however, may offer the stability and
opportunity for successful coping behavior.
These studies by Fenk, Bialer, and Kiehlbauch find
relevance here in that they suggest a possible connection
between situations in which individual's personal control
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has varied and subsequent increases or decreases in locus
of control orientations were observed.

In the Bialer

study, for example, i:f increased mental age is viewed as
relating to the development of skills through which one
can have an increasing effect on the environment, then an
accompanying sense of more personal control may have accounted for increased locus of control scores.

In the

Kiehlbauch investigation, fluxuations in internality and
extcrnality seemed coincidental with situations in which
individuals would sense varying amounts of personal control.
It seems suggested that if increases in personal control
in a situation are experienced, then a subsequent increase
in internal orientations may follow; and that if personal
control in a situation is reduced, then a more external
orientation may be consequential.

Other studies seem to

support this notion.
Gorman (1968) expected that shifts in.the direction
of external control would occur in situations in which a
person's expectancy for self-directed success was diminished.

He made an accidental observation of a group mean

score on the Rotter I-E scale (Rotter Internal-External
Locus of Control Scale) which was significantly more external than the group mean for college students reported
in Rotter's (1966) monograph.

By circumstance
college .
.

students were given the Rotter scale the day after McCarthy
lost the Democratic national primary in 1968.

Gorman, who

states that the majority of students taking the test were
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McCarthy supporters, said also that the comparatiwely more
external scores may have occurred in lieu of the previous
day's events.
In another study, similar to Gorman's in that a national event may have affected control orientations, McArthur
(1970) hypothesized that individual expectancies for ex- .
ternal control would vary directly with the favorableness
of draft lottery outcome.

Conditions of the lottery were

such that prior to the first drawing all subjects potentially could have been drafted, however after the drawing
some

subject~

would be safe with little or no draft poten-

tial and some would remain potential draftees,

Subjects

who would have been affected one way or the other by the
lottery were given the Rotter I-E scale the day following
the lottery and were found to show a greater external expectancy than a control group tested prior to the drawing.
Within the experimental group it was found that those favorably affected by the lottery were significantly more external than those not favorably affected, largely

account~

ing for the greater external scores of the entire experimental group as compared with the control group.

Thus

subjects whose fates were more affected by the lottery
drawing scored as significantly more external.
The findings by Gorman and McArthur seem to support
the notion that the degree of perceived personal control
in situations may have an effect on internal-external control orientations.

Although the experimental designs of
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these studies were poor, there appears to be at least some
basis for considering that· control orientations may become
more external when influenced by situations which take away one's feeling of personal control.

It is obvious that

more controlled studies are needed to explore the effects
of situational manipulations on locus of control expec. tancies.

While the present investigation is such an at-

tempt, there have been other studies focusing on the oituational determinants under which expectancies change
(Phares, 1957; Rotter, Liverant, and Crowne, 1961).

These

studies do not use a testing scale to measure expectancies
but take into consideration subject's verbalized expectancies of performance in a task situation.

They are pre-

sented here to show the effects of experience in particular types of circumstances designated as chance and skill
situations.
Phares (1957) in one of the earliest published reports
of task structuring from a social learning framework, studied expectancy changes in skill and chance situations. The
study involved situational determinants under which expectancies change.

A skill situation was seen by Phares as

one in which the occurrence of reinforcement is related by
the subject to his own performance, whereas a chance situation was viewed as one wherein the subject perceives the
task so difficult that skill is not so functionally involved as much as luck or the "experimenter's whim."

Sub-

jects were told that success on line and color discrimin-
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;ation tasks were due to skill or chance.

It was found

that despite obtaining equal reinforcements on the task
those receiving skill directions changed expectancies more
frequently in the direction of previous experience, and
that skill conditions produced more expectancy changes.
In a similar study, Rotter, Liverant, and Crowne (1961)
examined the growth and extinction of expectancies in situations regarded as chance and skill based on the previous
cultural experience of the subject rather than by task
instructions.

They found that under skill conditions

positive and. negative reinforcements led to stronger increments and decrements in verbalized expectancies.
If it can be assummed that skill and chance situations reflect circumstances of control or no control then
the two studies mentioned above find relevance here.

In

both studies expectancies would have changed depending on
the amount on control given.

The findings would further

imply that experience in situations where individuals have
control produce different responses when c:ompared to ai tu_;
ations where they have no control.

Skill and chance situ-

ations could therefore be used to determine the effects of
control pr no control given to subjects on their more generalized expectancies, not only on specific task performance expectancies as explored by Phares and Rotter, et al.
One investigation which uses chance and skill situations as experiences of external control and internal control situations which might influence expectations or

11

feelings of control as measured by the Rotter I-E
was conducted by Eisenman (1972).

~cale

Subjects in two exper-

imental groups were tested on the Rotter I-E scale before
and immediately following verbal conditioning tasks on
which they were told that they had either personal control
(skill instructions) or no personal control (chance instructions).

The personal control group was told that

their "clinical sensitivity" would lead to excellent responses and therefore their skill was important in the
task.

The no control group was told that correct re-

sponces were impossible and that they should make guesses,
as the investigation was being conducted to determine if
random guesses follow theoretical expectations about randomness.

A third group who wrote stories to Thematic Apper-

ception Test cards and was also tested in p're-post fashion
on the Rotter I-E scale, was used as a control.

Eisenman

found that subjects in the skill or internally oriented
condition significantly increased their I-E scores to a
more internal score_{t=2.85, p<.01).

He also found sig-

nificant externally directed changes in scores of subjects
in the chance or externally oriented condition (t=2.6J,
p<.01).
changes.

The control group showed no significant score
In discussing his results Eisenman states that

his study has' implications for the successful modification
of the way in which a person looks at the locus of control
of reinforcements.
that experience in

He also states his findings suggest
situ~tions

in which the subject believes
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he has control over events can increase the lirelihood of
his believing that he has control over reinforcements.· In
the same way, repeated experience in situations where one
feels he has no control can lead to diminished feelings of
his being able to control his environment.
The Eisenman study is of prime importance in the
sent investigation for two reasons.

pre~

First, the findings

indicate the modifiability of locus of control orientations
as measured by the Rotter I-E scale.

Secondly, a variable

responsible for effecting locus of control change, which
was only loo.sely suggested in the studies previously reviewed here, was more clearly defined.

This variable

seems to err.erge as the experience of personal control,
or of no personal control, in situations.

That such a var-

iable would be of importance in the present study seems
further supported in the literature.
Norwicki and Barnes (1973). studied the effects of a
highly structured camp experience on the locus of control
orientations of predominantely Negro inner-city teenage
youngsters.

The inner city environment from which the sub-

jects came was viewed as providing chaotic behavioral contingencies contributing to a sense of powerlessness.
Eight groups of the young subjects were tested for their
locus of control orientations as measured by the NorwickiStrickland scale both before and after a five and one-half
day period of outdoor education and camping experience
which stressed working together to accomplish goals.

The
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groups participated over eight successive weeks. the eighth
group consisting of individuals who attended the camp experience once before during the seven previous weeks.

It

was found that five out of the eight groups showed significant increases in internality and all groups except one
showed an internal shifting, the one exception showing no
apparent change.

The investigation is rather convincing in

thnt eight separate replications occurred producing an overall difference of t=5.94.

p~.002.

Also the eighth group,

consisting of former camp participants continued the internal shifting in their scores which were still lower at
the end of the second week than at the end of the first
week's

exp~rience.

The investigators concluded that the

camping experience had a definite effect on changing campers' locus of

co~trol,

indicating that the experience made

subjects feel more in control of events and better able to
see connections .between their behavior and its consequences
in terms of reinforcement.

It was also felt that the case

in which youngsters returned for a second week further reflected the effects of the experience and thus lessened
errors of measurement or chance.

Of further importance is

that the changes in scores were indicated on a general measure of locus of control consisting of items not specifically related to the camping experience itself.
Other studies seem to support the notion that increased
personal control in situations can lead to more internal
control orientations. ·Many of these studies are therapy
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oriented and use a pre-post means of assessing locus of control expectancies.

Smith (1970), for example, studied changes

in locus of control as a function of life crisis resolution
by using a pre-post administration of the Rotter I-E scale
with subjects who underwent specific crisis intervention
counselling between testings.

A control group of noncris.is

outpatients was also tested on the Rotter I-E scale.

Smith

found significant changes to a more internal orientation
in the I-E scores of the crisis group as compared to no significant score changes in the grour of noncrisis outpatients.
Smith states that his results support the prediction that
as the person begins to resolve the crisis by learning
and beginning to use more effective coping mechanisims,
feelings of helplessness decline.

One then would increas-

ingly come to regard themselves as having some measure of
control over their life situations.
Another therapy oriented study citing change in prepost scores as measured by the Rotter I-E scale was conducted by Dua {1970).

College females expressing concern

about their ability to relate in interpersonal situations
were used in three matched groups as follows: 1) an action
oriented program designed to help the subject define the
interpersonal problem in behavioral terms and then net up
a sequence of specific new actions to try in the specified
situation; 2) a reeducation program to influence attitudes
the subject had toward those with which they had the problem with focus on cognitive processes and verbal interac-
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tion; and J) a control group which received the Rotter I-E
scale at the pre-post times indicated for the other groups.
Dua found the experimental groups to decrease in externali ty in comparison with the control, the action oriented
program producing the most internally directed changes.
Still another study focusing on the effects of increasing.
one's skills in specific situations showed that such led
to significant shifts in I-E scores (Martin and Shepel,

1974).

That study involved the brief but highly

struc~

turcd training of senior female nurses to be more effec ...
tive

patien~

counsellors.

Other studies showing signifi-

cant changes in locus of control scores as measured by the
Rotter I-E scale and using group counselling or encounter
sessions as independent variables have been reported in
the literature (Diamond and Shiparo, 1973; Felton, 1973;
Remains, 1974) •
Taken together these studies appear to support the
notion that the experience of personal control or no personal control in situations is an important variable in
influencing locus of control orientations.

Lefcourt (1972)

in a review of studies concerned with changes in locus of
control orientations concludes that such research offers
confirmation of a theoretically pro·bable relationship between increased effectiveness and increased perception of
personal control.

He states that "as persons successfully

cope with immediate difficulties they do seem to experience
an increase in perceived contro1 ·(p. 31).
11

These remarks
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substantiate the importance of the experience of having an
effect, or some degree of control, in situations.

That

experienced "effectiveness," in turn, seems to influence a
p~rson's

more general control orientation.

In addition,

Lefcourt suggests a second interesting and necessarily related variable that would be of interest here in examining
the modifiability of

~ontrol

orientations, the degree of

success in situations.
That success and failure

hav~

an effect on postper-

formance attribution of causality was demonstrated in an
investigatio.n by Sobel (1974).

Sobel catagorically in-

formed subjects that they either failed or succeeded on a
word

unscr~mbling

respectively.

task at the 32nd or 93rd percentiles.

Subjects then were asked to scale four in-

ternal and four external factors in ·terms of their influencial importance on task performance.

Internal items in-

cluded intelligence, ability to concentrate, ability to
think quickly, and skill in problem solving.

External

factors scaled were item difficulity, amount of time alotted, features of the work environment, and time of day.
Sobel found that "success" on the task produced attribution to internal factors, while "failure" was attributed
to external factors.

The study, which also examined locus

of control orientations on the Rotter I-E scale in a single
testing, showed that I-E scores had no mediating effects on
attribution in the success conditions and some influence
in the failure conditions.
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The study by Sobel may implement success and failure
as factors having some part in influencing locus of control
orientations.

If subjects in that study attributed success

to internal factors, then perhaps experiences of success
would increase one's sense of personal control.

Conversely,

if Sobel's subjects attributed failure to external factors,
then perhaps experiences of failure would decrease one's
sense of personal control.

The notion that success and

failure experiences may influence locus of control orientations will be examined in the present investigation.
Studies

spec~fically

designed to examine the influence of

success and failure as variables that would modify control
orientations seem lacking in the voluminous locus of control literature.

While the response to success and fail-

ure experiences, especially as affecting individuals designated as internals and externals, has been explored in
depth (Lefcourt, 1972), such investigations differ considerably from viewing those variables as effecting orientation change.

Studies noting the differential responding

of internals and externals will, however, find mentionable relevance here later in discussing the results of the
current investigation.
One study does appear recently in the literature
which strongly suggests success as an important variable
in affecting the expectancy of internal control.
lon~itudinal

Using

and cross-sectional data, multiple regression

analysis and an eleven item abbreviated version of the
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Rotter I-E scale, Andrisani and Nestel (1976) examined the
following: 1) the influence of internal and external control on a number of facets of the work experience, and
2) the influence of the work experience on change in internal-external control.

Results showed a systematic in-

fluence of internal-external control in the world of work,;
this observation strengthened by the fact that such relationships were independent of individual differences in
skills, abilities, and demographic distribution.

More

relevant to the investigation here, Andrisani and Nestel
further

sta~e

that "the data also provide considerable

support for the hypothesis that success at work enhances
the expectancy of internal control" (p. 156).
Studies reviewed here provide firm evidence that individuals' locus of control orientations are subject to
modification.

That individuals' expectancies of control

undergo both stability and change has theoretical support
when, to reiterate a point made here earlier by Lefcourt

(1976), orientations are viewed as constructions rather
than as personality traits or typology.

Though locus of

control modifiability has then both theoretical and solid
experimental support, the literature seems to be void of
studies which would specifically establish factors responsible for effecting change in these constructions of control.

The present study will attempt to help fill this

void.
The investigations reviewed in this study do, however,
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suggest factors which together or independently may be
responsible for modifying control orientations.

The work,

expecially by Eisenman (1972), implies that the experience
of personal control or no personal control over events in
situations may be important variables and also suggests
that locus of control score shifts may occur in the

rela~

tively short time span afforded by an experimental setting.
Situations of personal control and no personal control will
be under investigation in the present study as independent
variables.

Also, the work by Sobel (1974) and Andrisani

and Nestel (1976) suggest that the experiences of success
and failure may affect causal attributions.

Success and

failure will therefore also be under investigation in the
present study as independent variables.

The additional

studies reviewed here seem to provide further support for
examining the above factors as influencing change in locus
of control orientations.
Indeed, the modification of one's locus of control
would appear to have interesting and useful implications,
and further study would seem both relevant and beneficial.
Singer (1965) points out that the belief in personal or internal ·control is a principal goal of all theraputic efforts.

"(This) single proposition ••• underlies all forms

of psychotherapy: the proposition that man is capable of
change and capable of bringing this change about himself ••• "
(p. 16).

Lefcourt (1972) supports this notion.by stating.

that an internal locus.of control is a common goal of
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psychotherapy and that if one needs to alter their mode of
behavior, then an external control orientation is a decided
obstacle, and therefore, a target for change.

Joe (1971)

in summarizing his review of studies concerned with the
relation of internal-external scores to personality characteristics, says that "the findings depict externals, in.
contrast to internals as being relatively anxious, aggressive, dogmatic, and less trustful and more suspicious of
others, 1acldng in self confidence and insight, having low
needs for social approval, and having a greater tendency
to use sensitizing modes of defenses" (p. 623).

Rotter

(1975), meanwhile, cautions that a "good-bad guy" dichotomy should not be so readily applied to internals and externals though there may be some truth to that notion in
some instanses.

He states also that adjustment is a values

concept and that there are limits on personal control.
Gurin et al (1969) raise interesting questions about the
usual assumption in the internal-external control literature that effective mo ti va ti on alwa:fs flows from internal
orientations.

These investigators interpret information

from Rotter (1966) that a curvilinear relationship may exist between the I-E control dimension and personal adjustment such tha.t extreme scorers may be less psychologically
well adjusted (when associated with success an internal
orientation can lead to feelings of competency and effecacy
but can lead to self derogation and self blame when associated with failure); and· state their own findings that when
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personal control and system blame were factor analyzed
from Rotter's scale, external rather than internal orientation became associated with more effective behaviors in
a Negro population.

Taken together, these opinions and

studies, while representing different points of view in
regards to the directionality of control orientation
change, do.not seem to argue against the value in assessing
the role of variables responsible for change in either
direction.

Indeed, it is contended here that such assess-

ment would open up interesting possibilities in these

con~

troversial areas as well.
The investigation here takes into consideration variables which may have an effect in modifying locus of control orientations. ·While the factors underlying such
change appear re+ated to experiences of situations in
which one has or does not nave personal control, the experiences of success or failure in those situations may
also be contributing factors.
Specifically, the present investigation explores the
effects of 1) the experience of personal control as provided in a task situation involving skill, 2) the experience of no personal control as provided in a task situation involving chance, J) the experience of success as
provided by falsified task feedback, and 4) the experience
of failure as also provided by falsified task feedback; as
I

independent variables that may have an effect on altering
subjects' locus of control orientations.

This study is
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intended to be a partial replication of the Eisenman (1972)
study with further consideration of the effects of falsified performance feedback.

On the basis of Eiserunan's

findings it is hypothesized that in situations involving
skill, the experience of personal control will lead to an
increase in internal control; whereas in situations involving chance the experience of no personal control would
lead to an increase in external control.

It is further

hypothesized that success in the task situation would lead
to increased internal control and that failure would lead
to increased external control.

Results would be relevant

then in determining the effects of a short-termed experimental experience on locus of control as indicated by a
standard measure of control orientation, and carry with
them implication,s for research in areas specifically concerned

wi~h

effecting change in control orientations such

as individual and group therapies or in modifying the control orientations of larger social or class groups.

B. METHOD

1. Subjects
A

total of seventy college students enrolled in summer

session classes_ were employed on a voluntary basis for participation in the present investigation.

Due to the prob-

lems of decreased student availability during summer class
sessions it was necessary to solicit volunteers'from three
Richmond, Virginia learning institutions as follows: twenty-
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two students from the University of Richmond, fourteen students from Virginia Commonwealth University, and thirtyfour students from J. Sargeant Reynolds Community College.
Fifty-five of the participating students were from introductory psychology classes, while fifteen students were
from philosophy or English classes at the University of
Richmond.
2. Apparatus and materials
A quiet, distraction-free classroom at each of the above mentioned schools was used for initial experimental
procedures. · Several subjects thus were able to participate
. in the initial phase of the experiment at the same time.
Also at each school facility a smaller distraction-free
room and a desk or table with a divider in the middle were
used for the sec9nd phase of the experiment.

The divided

desk arrangement insured that the experimenter was out of
the subject's sight while each individually performed the
task and answered additional questions.
Materials used in the present investigation included
a slightly abbreviated version of the Rotter (1966) Internal-External Locus of Control Scale.

The Rotter I-E Scale

was chosen primarily because of its wide useage in the literature and its useage in the Eisenman (19?2) study.

Al-

though the scale's correlation with social desireability
has a questionable effect on its validity, research on
that issue has not been conclusive (MacDonald, 197J).
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,

There has been more evidence supplied concerning the dimensionality of the Rotter I-E Scale as affecting its validity (Gurin, 1969; Mirels, 1970; Abrahanson, et al, 197J:
Viney, 1974; Cherlin and Bourque, 1974; Rotter, 1975).
This evidence has stimulated its useage in the present
study as excluding the five politically oriented items (#3,

#12, #17, #22, #29).
Additional printed materials used included various
task instruction sheets and answer sheets, consent forms,
and debriefing sheets, all of which · are .. . explained in
=

the experimental procedures, p1,AlLmate'rials · are included
as appendices J.,thtough: .IXi to this thesis.

J. Procedure
All subjects were asked to read and sign an informed
consent document which in general terms explained;the·procedures they would be involved in as a research participant,
that personal data they supplied would be held confidential,
and their rights as volunteer subjects.
document subjects were

t~sted

After signing this

for their locus of control

orientation on the slightly abbreviated Rotter I-E Scale.
This initial phase of experimental procedure took place ten
days to two weeks prior to a second experimental phase
which included involvement in a task situation and posttesting on the Rotter I-E Scale.
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of six experimental groups or a control group before participating
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in the second phase of experimental procedures such that
all groups would contain an equal number of subjects.

Ten

subjects were thus assigned to each of those seven groups.
Three of the six experimental groups were designated as
"personal control" or skill-oriented groups while the remaining three experimental groups were designated as "no .
personal control" or chance-oriented groups.

These skill-

oriented and chance-oriented groups were further designated
to receive a particular mode of catagorical task feedback
as follows: 1) one skill-oriented group and one chance-oriented group received falsified success feedback, 2) one
skill-oriented group and one chance-oriented group received
falsified failure feedback, and J) one skill-oriented group
and one chance-oriented group received no task performance
feedback.

The c9ntrol group received no skill or chance

orientation for the task and no task performance feedback.
Subjects were seen individually for the second phase
of the experiment in a session lasting approximately onehalf hour.

Upon arriving for this session each subject

was given a set of written instructions when seated and
asked to read them silently.

After each subject read the

instructions the experimenter reviewed them with the subject to ensure that they were fully understood.

Basic

instructions informed all subjects that they would participate in a task oriented study involving paired word associations made

by

another

person, that they would be given

a short description of ·a person followed by a list of ten
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given words, and that their task was to write in the blank
next to each given word another word which they thought the
described person might have associated or paired with that
given word.

Completing the list of ten given words in this

manner constituted one trial and each subject responded to
three·such trials.

At this point subjects were not told ·

that the persons to be described to them were fictitious.
Instructions differed for subjects depending on the
experimental group to which they were randomly assigned.
Subjects in the "personal control" or skill-oriented groups,
in addition to the basic instructions, were informed that
while responses by the person described had some logical
connection to the given word "it is surprizing how much
your clinical

sen~itivity

to the individual's description

given here can lead to correctly determining their responses."
Emphasis in the instructions for these groups was therefore
on personal skill as an important factor for successful
task performance.

Subjects in the "no personal control"

or chance-oriented groups received the basic instructions
but were also informed that in spite of some logical connection in word associations made by the described person,
successfully guessing their responses would be a "matter
of luck."

The emphasis for these "no personal control"

groups in the instructions was therefore on chance, conveying that success on the task was out of their control.
Subjects in the control group received only the basic instructions.
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Upon completing the instruction sheet each subject was
given a task answer sheet containing the brief descriptions
of three persons each followed by a list of ten words with
blanks next to each word.

Subjects were again reminded to

stop after performing each trial.
After completing each trial, subjects in the experimental groupn designated to receive falsified feedback received the feedback appropriate to the performance condition to which they were assigned.

These subjects received

the feedback information in a standard written form below
each indicated trial.

The standard written form included

a fictitious "average score" for others on that trial followed by the subject's "score" and an adjective describing
their performance in.comparison to others'.

Subjects re-

ceiving success feedback were informed over the three
·trials that their responses were 80%, 90%, 90% correct
with the respectively written adjectives "very good," "excellent," "excellent."

Those in the failure conditions

received the feedback respective to each trial as followss
20%, 10%, 10% and the adjectives "poor," "very poor," and
"very poor."

Those subjects in the control group and no

feedback conditions were instructed, as were success and
failure subjects, to stop after completing each trial and
to inform the experimenter that they had finished.

All

answer sheets thus were collected briefly for evaluation
but neither the no feedback groups nor the control group
received any performance feedback.
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In addition to performing the word association task
all subjects were asked to indicate on separate rating
scales responses to questions deemed as relevant and necessary in determining the validity of the present investigative procedures.

Specifically, these were questions

relating to subjects' task motivation, performance expec-.
tations, and whether the task was perceived as skill or
'chance related.

Subjects were asked to rate how important

the task, and doing well on the task, was to them to determine task motivation; and how they thought they would do on
the task to .determine performance expectation.

These rat-

ings were completed by subjects on the task instruction
sheet immetliately after reading and reviewing the instructions with the experimenter and just prior to commencing
the task.

Also,

immediately following task and feedback

procedures, subjects were asked to re-rate to what extent
the task involved skill or chance.
Upon completion of the task and final rating question,
all subjects were asked to complete the slightly abbreviated
Rotter I-E Scale again as a favor for a colleague of the
experimenter.

At both the pre-trial and post-trial admin-

istrations of this I-E scale was included a final question
asking subjec,ts to rate how the day had been so far for
them. This rating question was asked as a check.for.the effects .of the day on I-E question responses.
Following all experimental procedures subjects re-

29
ceived and read a standard debriefing sheet explaining deceptions in which they were involved and the true nature of
the research.

This debriefing sheet was reviewed with the

experimenter and an opportunity for further explanation was
given.

All subjects were thanked for their participation

in the research.

C. RESULTS
Analysis of Loe!!§_ of Control

Seo~

Means and standard deviations for locus of control
scores {I-E scores) are presented in Table 1, Appendix

X.

A three-factor, mixed analysis of variance {ANOVA) with repeatcd measures on one factor was used to test the effects
of task instruction (skill vs. chance biased) and task
feedback {no
scores.

fee~back,

success, failure) on trials of I-E

I-E scores were obtained both before and after task

manipulation, and are represented by the repeated trials
factor in this design.

A

pictori~l

representation of the

design appears in Figure 1. A Hartley F-maximum test revealed no significant difference in the variance of I-E
scores within task instruction and task feedback treatment
groups, permitting the assumption of homogeneity of variance between, treatment populations (Frnax
12

' 9

tion
J.19.

= 5.91;

Fmax • ,
95

= 10. 7).
Analysis of the data revealed a significant

x feedback

= 4.02;

instruc~

=

, ,
95 2 54
A summary of this analysis appears in Table 2, AppenX trials interaction {F

F.
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dix

z.
'11ASK FEEDBACK

NO

FIGURE 1.

SUCCESS

FAILURE

Design for analysis of locus of control scores.

The significant interaction found in this analysis
was explored by examining the effects of task instruction
(skill vs. chance) on trials of I-E scores at each of the
three levels of feedback.

Mean I-E scores for skill and

chance instructed groups at each mode of feedback are plotted in Figure 2.

A two-factor, mixed ANOVA with repeated

measures on one factor revealed a significant task instruction X trials interaction under the condition of success
feedback (F = 5.78; F.

, ,
= 4.LH) .. A summary of this
95 1 18
analysis appears in Table 3, Appendix
No significant

K.

findings were revealed for the no-feedback and failure
conditions.
4 and

5,

Summaries of these analyses appear in Tables:

Appendix·

X.
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FIGURE 2. Mean locus of control scores for skill and
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The significant task instruction X trials interaction
found at the level of success feedback was further analyzed
using single-factor ANOVA designs.

Examination of task in-

struction groups at each of the "pre" and "post" score trial
levels did not reveal significant findings.

Significant

findings were also not noted when the "pre" and "post" score
trials were examined at each of the two levels of task instruction.

Summaries for these analyses appear in Tables

6, ?, 8, and 9, Appendix

X·

To complete the analysis of locus of control scores
"pre" and "post" score trials.for the control group were
analyzed.

Means and standard deviations are presented in

Table 10, Appendix

z.

A single-factor ANOVA with repeated

measures revealed no significant difference between score
trials for the

co~trol

group.

A summary of this analysis

appears in Table 11, Appendix

Z.

Analysis of Day Ratings
Means and standard deviations for subjects' ratings of
the question, "How has the day been for you so far today?"
made immediately following both administrations of the
Rotter I-E Scale, are presented in Table 12, Appendix XI.

A

three-factor, mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the rating factor was used to analyze the data.

The analysis ex-

amined these ratings as made by subjects in task instruction
and task feedback groups.
design appears in Figure

A pictorial representation of the

J.

A

Hartley F-maximum test re-

JJ

NO

FIGURE

TA.SK FEEDI3IiCK
SUCCESS
FAILURE

J. Design for analysis of day ratings.

vealed no significant difference in rating variances within
treatment groups, allowing for the assumption of homogeneity
of variance between treatment populations (Fmax

.95,12,9

= 4.BJ;

Fmax

= lO.?).

Analysis of the data revealed no significant effects.

A

summary of the analysis appears in Table 13, Appendix XI.
Analysis of Skill/Chance Ratings
Means and standard deviations for subjects' ratings of
the extent to which they felt the task involved skill or
chance are presented in Table 14, Appendix XII.

These rat-

ings were analyzed using· a three-factor, mixed ANOVA with

J4

repeated measures on the rating factor.

Explored in this

analysis were the effects of task instruction and task feedback on two rating trials.

A first or pre-task rating was

obtained immediately after receiving task instructions but
before starting the task, and a second or post-task rating
was obtained immediately after task and feedback procedures.
The design is represented pictorially in Figure 4.

A Hart-
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Figure 4. Design for analysis of skill/chance ratings.

ley F-maximum test found no significant difference in the

variance of rating scores within treatment groups, permitting the assumption of homogeneity of variance between treat-

= 6.9;

Fmax . 95 , 12 , 9 =,10.7).
Analysis of the data revealed a significant task in-

ment populations (Fmax
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struction X task feedback X trials interaction (F = 3.25;
F.

95 , 2 , 54 = 3.19.

A summary of the analysis appears in

Table 15, Appendix XI.
The significant instruction X feedback X trials interaction was explored by examining the effects of task instruction on the two trials of rating at each of the three
levels of task feedback.

In Figure 5 mean rating scores

for skill and chance instructed groups are plotted at each
level of feedback.

A two-factor, mixed ANOVA with repeated

measures on the rating factor revealed a significant task
instruction .X trials interaction at the level of success
feedback (F

= 8.61;

F.

95 , 1 , 18

= 4.41).

A significant task

instruction X trials interaction was also found at the level
of failure feedback using a similar analysis (F = 9.41; F.

95
Using the same two-factor, mixed design sig-

1 , 18 = 4.41).
nificant findings were not noted at the level of no-feedback.

Summaries of each of these three analyses appear in

Tables 16, 17, and 18, Appendix XII.
The significant task instruction X rating trials interaction found under both the success and £ailure conditions stimulated further the exploration of those interactions at each of those feedback levels.

A single-factor ·

ANOVA revealed that at the level of success feedback a significant difference existed between the pre-task ratings of
skill instructed and chance instructed groups (F
F.

95 , 1 , 18 = 4.41).

post-task ratings of

= 32.7;

A significant difference between the
th~se

groups under the success condi-
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FIGURE 5. Moan skill/chance ratings for skill and chance
instructed groups at each level of feedback.

J7
tion was also found (F

= 5.4);

F.

, ,
= 4.41).
95 1 18

a significant

factor ANOVA also revealed

A single-

difference between

the pre-task and post-task ratings of the chance instructed
group (F

= 6.50;

F.

, ,
95 1 18

= 4.41),

but no pre-task to post-

tasl:: rating differences for the skill instructed group under
Tables 19, 20, 21, and 22 in Appen-

the success condition.

dix XII present summaries for these analyses.
The significant task instruction X rating trials interaction found at the level of failure feedback stimulated examination of that interaction.

Breaking the design further

under the condition of failure feedback, a single-factor
ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the pretask ratings of skill instructed and chance instructed groups

(F

= 21.57:

F.

no significant

, ,
95 1 18

= 4.41).

f~ndings

their post-task ratings.

Using a single-factor ANOVA

were noted between those groups for
Also, under the failure condition

it was found that the pre-task rating for the skill instructed group was significantly different from their post-task
rating (F

= 8.J7;

F.

95 , 1 , 18 = 4.41), while there was no

significant difference between the pre-task and post-task
ratings of the chance instructed group.

Tables 2J, 24, 25,

and 26 in Appendix XII present summaries for each of these
analyses.
Analysis of Task Motivation Rating Question: "How important
is this task to you'?"
Means and standard deviations for subjects' ratings of
how important the task .was to them are presented in Table 27,

J8
Appendix XIII.

Ratings were obtaineu immediately after

subjects' received task instruction, but before they began
the task and only one time.

An insignificant Hartley F-max-

imim test finding (Fmax = 1.5J: Fmax . 95 , 6 , 9 = 7.6) permitted the assumption of homogeneity of population variance.
A two-factor ANOVA was used to analyze ratings made by task
instruction and task feedback groups, and no significant
findings were indicated.

A summary of the analysis appears

in Table 28, Appendix XIII.
Analysis of Task Motivation Question: "How important is it
that you do well on this task?"
Means and standard deviations for subjects' ratings of
how important it was that they do well on the task are presented in Table 29, Appendix XIV.

A two-factor ANOVA was

used to analyze ratings made by task instruction and task
feedback groups.

One rating was made by each subject and

it was obtained immediately after subjects' received task
instruction but before they began the task.

An insignifi-

cant Hartley F-maximim test finding (Fmax - 5.04; Fmax •

95 ,

= 7.6) permitted the assumption of homogeneity of popu619
lation variance. Analysis of the data revealed that ratings made by groups receiving different modes of task instruction differed significantly {F
4~02).

Groups

rec~iving

= 4.21;

F.

95 ,l,.54

=

skill biased instructions had

higher ratings, indicating greater importance that they do
well, than the groups receiving chance biased instructions.
Mean ratings for task instructed groups are plotted in Fig-
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ure 6.

1~

summary of the analysis is presented in Table JO,

Appendix XIV.
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FIGURE 6. Mean ratings of task instruction.groups for
rating question: "How important is it that you do well
on this task?"
Analysis of task performance expectancy question: "How
well do you think XQ..1-! will do Q!1 this task?
Means and standard deviations for subjects' ratings
of how well they expected to do on the task are presented
in Table 31, Appendix XV.

A two-factor ANOVA was used to

determine rating differences between task instruction and
task feedback groups.

These ratings were also obtained

immediately after subjects received task instruction but
before they began the task, and only one time.

A Hartley

F-maximum test fpund a significant difference. in rating
varianc6 within treatment populations (Fmax

.95,6,9

==

~

12.53; Fmax

7 · 6 ).

The analysis revealed a significant difference in ratings made by the task feedback groups (F = 7.6; F.

95 , 2 , 54

=

40
3.2).

Mean ratings for task feedback groups are plotted in

Figure 7.

A Neuman Kuel's Multiple Range Test was used to
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FIGURE 7. Mean ratings of task feedback groups for rating
question; "How well do you think you will do on this task?"

determine which feedback groups differed in their mean ratings.
cantly

The no-feedback group was found to have a signifilower

feedback group..

expectancy to do well than the success
A summary of this a!lalysis appears in_.

Table 32, Appendix XV.
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D. DISCUSSION

The present investigation has explored variables which
might be responsible for effecting change in individuals'
locus of control orientations.

Based primarily on the work

by Eisenman (1972) it was hypothesized in this study that
in a task situation involving skill the experience of personal control would lead to increased internal control,
whereas in a task situation involving chance the experience
of no personal control would lead to increased external
control.

It was further hypothesized that, based on the

studies by Sobel (1974) and Andrisani and Nestel (1976),
tksk success would lead to increased internal control and
task failure would lead to increased external control. Data
supplied in this investigation provide no direct support
for these hypotheses in the sense that personal control
(as established in a task situation involving skill), no
personal control {as established in a task situation involving chance), success feedback, and failure feedback
had no independent effects on locus of control scores.
Results of the current investigation do, however, indicate that significant interactive effects exist between
locus of control scores, task instructions which describe
the task as involving personal control (skill) or no personal control (chance), and feedback indicative of highly
successful performance on the task.

This investigation

was not able to provide further cortclusions on'the nature
LIBF</!:.~Y
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of these interacting variables as the various analyses
breakdowns designed to explore their effects yielded insignificant results.

One tenable explanation for the in-

ability to further specify' significant variables is that
the power of these breakdown analyses was greatly reduced.
The process of breaking the design down to explore specific
factors at levels of other factors necessitated the use of
decreased degrees of freedom in their statistical analyses.
Fewer degrees of freedom consequently decreased the power
of these analyses and contributed to the possibility of a
Type II error.

An important and more specific treatment

effect could thus exist yet.lack the statistical support
that is necessary to substantiate it.
Based on the results of this investigation it is evident that furth,er r€search is necessary in order to draw
conclusions about the nature of the interaction found.

A

study designed to explore the interactive factors of task
instruction which would place the subject in a situation of
control (skill) or no control (chance), task feedback indicative of success, and locus of control orientation
should include a larger population than that which existed
per group in the present study.

Increased sample size

would thus increase the

power of such an investi-

anal~rsis

gation and directly help to reduce the possibility of a
Type II error as discussed above.
Further research on the factors found to significantly
interact in the present study should also take into

consid~
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eration the apparent tendency for subjects receiving skill
instructions to become more internal when successful and for
subjects receiving chance instructions to become more external when successful.

This tendency, apparent from data

supplied by the current study, could be useful in the formulation of hypotheses for further
cant interaction found here.

re~earch

on the

signifi~

Also, in the present study an

interesting tendency existed for subjects who were either
skill or chance oriented and who received failure
for their task performance.

fe~dback

The subjects who received skill

instructions became more external and those who received
chance instructions became more internal und~r the condition
of failure.

These tendencies for subjects to change their

control orientations in the directions as indicated and as
under the various conditions of task instruction and task
feedback, while not given statistical support here, could
provide a basis for future research efforts in this area.
While studies specifically designed to test the interaction
of the variables of personal control or no personal control
and success or failure are not apparent in the literature
to date; the present investigation has generated information for further study.
In viewing the results of this study that pertain to
the modification of subjects' locus of control orientations,
several ''within the design" issues should be discussed which
shed light both on the limitations and strengths of the investigation.

One_ such issue involves the procedure of test-
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ing locus of control orientations on a pre-task and posttask basis.

A specific concern with this issue involves

the consistency between the pre-task and post-task I-E
scores of subjects who did not receive any main treatment
effects •. These were, of course, the control group subjects
who did not receive skill or chance biased task instruction
or any task feedback, but who still performed the task.

It

was found that there was no significant difference in the
pre-task and post-task 1-E scores for this control group,
indicating that such scores were consistent over the time
period between testings.

If there had been a significant

difference between these scores then any significant difference between the pre-task and post-task scores of subjects receiving the main treatment effects could not have
been attributed solely to a result of those effects.

Rather,

other factors from outside of the experimental setting .itself would have been influencial, or perhaps other factors
related to being involved in the task situation itself
might have produced a change in control orientation.

The

consistency between the pre-task and post-task 1-E scores
of the control found in this study allows such extraneous
factors to be ruled out with some degree of confidence.
Use of the control group thus indicates that ·if siEnificant differences between pre-task and post-task scoresha:ll:Een
found among experimental groups, then such could be attributed to the main treatment effects and the possibility of
a Type I error would be minimal.
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Another concern with the "pre-post" testing precedure,
considered in the design of this study, is the effects that
the day's events might have had on subjects' responses to
questions on the Rotter scale. Indeed, such could be viewed
as one of the "extraneous factors" mentioned above, where
particular occurrences of the day which took place prior to
the experimental procedures might have influenced particular
questionaire responses and led to the possibility of Type I
error.

Day ratings made by subjects served as a check for

this type of error.

That no differences between groups on

their day ra.tings were found indicates that any changes in
control orientation of a particular treatment group would
not be due to the effects 0£ the day's events prior to the
experimental situation.

This does not mean that particular

events of a day did not affect subjects' responses to the
Rotter I-E scale questions, or that subjects in a particular
group did not differ in their responses to the day rating
questions, but that day rating responses were consistent
among treatment groups.

The use of random sampling proced-

ures enabled any differences produced by such effects to be
distributedamong groups as evenly as possible.

Again, data

on the day ratings supports the notion that differences in
day ratings between groups were not significnat.
Use of the pre-task and post-task testing procedure using the Rotter I-E scale presented a further difficulty.
Directions given with the scale called for answers to be as
close as possible to what the

subj~ct

was feeling at the
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time.

There was, however, no guarantee that subjects would

not attempt to remember and respond with the same answers
on the second testing as given on the first.

In fact, some

subjects who had completed the second testing of the Rotter
I-E scale voluntarily stated that they tried to respond the
same as they did the first time but were not sure if they.
had remembered all of the responses correctly!

In terms of

the present study it is not known how widely this attempt
was made over the course of the experiment, in spite of the
directions given to answer as one felt at the time and that
completion of the second questionaire was as a favor for a
colleague of the experimenter.

Such obviously may have min-

imized the measured effects of the main variables and increased the possibility of Type II error.

Future research

using the Rotter I-E scale in a "pre-post" fashion would do
well to improve on methods to reduce subjects' tendencies
to attain a consistency in their responses.

The use .of

different measures of control orientation at each testing
time or the rephrasing of original questions for the second
testing are suggested possibilities.
A second "within the design" issue involves the use of
the Rotter I-E scale itself in this investigation.

First,

subjects may have given responses not on the basis of what
they felt but··as answers they thought would be more mature,
morally right, or socially desirable •.

That subjects tend

toward this type of response has been addressed by Rotter

(1975).

Although the scale's correlation with social desir-
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ability has had a questionable effect on its validity, as
mentioned earlier, research on that issue has not been conclusive (MacDonald, 197J).

Such may certainly have been a

factor at play in the present study.
Secondly, the scppe of just what the Rotter I-E scale
measures should be taken into consideration (Lefcourt, 1976).
The scale measures causality

i~

terms of specific sources

of external control such as luck, chance, and powerful others.
~·Jhile

the present study places emphasis on chance and skill

situations, which seem to fall well.within the
scale's

ass~ssment

r~~g~tof

the

of causality, there might have been other

sources operating to produce a modified control orientation
to which the scale was insensitive.

The variables of suc-

cess and failure may be examples of such, as might be the
particular task situation employed in the study.

Questions

included on the scale may not have been sensitive enough to
the particular.task situation or success and failure experience to reflect changes in subjects' control orientations
as influenced by that situation or experience.

Indeed, as

Rotter (1975) points out, such is not so much the fault of
the scale itself which was designed as a broad gauge instrument and not as one to allow for high prediction in some
specific situation.

In terms of the present study this fac-

tor has two contrasting effects that are possible.

First,

the lack of specificity of I-E scale questions may have
failed to reflect a change in subjects' control orientation
for the particular situation involved in this study.

Secondly,
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the significant interaction of variables found in this study
may indicate the tendency for subjects to generalize changes
in their notions of causality experienced as a result of a
specific experimental task situation to questions which cov•
er situations broader in scope.

Also, that such a lab or-

iented situation could influence a change in one's broader
concept of causality seems signifi6ant, especially when the
possible effects produced by the same variables operating
in vivo are considered.

It would seem tenable that in the

context of the real world those variables would operate
with much greater effects.

That these factors operating in

a lab setting may have influenced modification of

subjects~

control orientation seems to enhance the notion that the
same variables operating in the context of the real world
would produce

ef~ects

similar in quality and probably great-

er in magnitude.
A third "within the desig~ issue is with how well the
skill and chance directions placed subjects in situations
which were actually perceived as skill (personal control)
and chance (no personal control) related.
directly addressed

~ithin

This issue was

the context of the study with

questions posed to subjects immediately after reading the
task instructions and immediately after completing the task
trials.

Subjects were asked at those times to rate to what

extent they felt the task involved skill or chance.

The

first rating, completed immediately after reading task instructions but before experiencing the task would give an
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indication of how well the instructions biased subjects'
concept of the task as one involving skill or chance.

Data

generated by this first rating indicate that subjects in
the ·groups' which were to receive success or failure feedback for their task performance did differ significantly
in their rating opinions.

In both of these feedback grou.ps

subjects who received chance biased instructicns rated the
task significantly more as one involving chance than the
subjects in these groups who received skill biased instructions.
tions as

Such supports the effectiveness of the task instrucpl~cing

subjects in a task situation viewed as in-

volving skill or chance.

This finding contributes to sub-

stantiating the validity of the experimental procedures used
in this investigation.
While the initial skill or chance ratings of subjects
in groups who were to receive success or failure feedback
did differ significantly as described above, subjects who
were to receive no feedback for their task performance were
not significnatly biased by these differing instructions.
While pre-task ratings for these subjects indicated that
those who received chance biased instructions felt that
more chance was involved than those who received skill biased instructions, this was not statistically significant.
The skill/chance biasing of subjects ·In the no feedback
group thus cannot be considered as effective •. This is in
contrast to the effectiveness of the skill/chance manipulation noted for the success and failure feedback groups.
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One possible explanation for this is that in the process
of explaining the task procedures the experimenter showed
the task answer sheet to each subject.

Task answer sheets

·for the no feedback group differed from those given to success and failure group subjects in that there was no indication that written feedback would be given to those in
the no feedback group.

It is possible that the feedback

group subjects saw that they would receive specific written
feedback for the task and thus paid closer attention to.the
task

instructions, thereby becoming more biased by the con-

tent of those instructions.
Data supplied by this study as q check on the effectiveness of

task instruction manipulation thus supports

the fact that a biasing effect did occur in those groups
which later

rec~eved

either success or failure feedback.

This biasing effect was such that subjects who were told
that the task involved skill rated the task as involving
skill, whereas those subjects who were told that the task
involved chance rated the task more as one involving chance.
These conclusions, as mentioned, are based on data supplied
by subjects' initial skill/chance ratings given prior to
their task.situation experience.
The second skill/chance ratine, given after task and
feedback pro6edures, supplied further data of interest.
Results of these post-task ratings indicate that chance instructed subjects rated the task as involving more skill,
after having received success feedback, when compared with
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their pre-task ratings.

The tendency for these chance or-

iented subjects to change their ratings of the task as involving more skill after having received success feedback
was statistically significant.

The skill instructed sub-

jects, however, who received success feedback on the task
did not significantly change their post-task ratings.

It

appears that subjects who were led to believe that the task
was one of chance felt that more skill or personal effort
was involved after having succeeded on the task, and their
ratings changed accordingly.

This result is highlighted

by the fact t-hat just reverse tendency was noted for subjects who received failure feedback.

It was found that

chance oriented subjects did not significantly change their
post-task ratings after failure, but that the skill oriented group did.

Th~se

skill oriented subjects who initially

rated the task as one of skill, significantly changed their
ratings of the task to one as involving more chance after
they had failed.

It appears that failure on the task led

these subjects to believe that less skill

or personal ef-

fort was involved, and their ratings changed accordingly.
It is also interesting to note that the post-task ratings
for the chance group subjects did not differ from their
pre-task ratings after failure.

Further, the skill orient-

ed group which' initially rated that significantly more
skill was involved in the task than that rated by the
chance group, changed their ratings after experiencing failure on the task to the same rating given by the chance group.
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In sum, data provided by the skill or chance ratings
in this investigation indicates not only that the skill and
chance instructions were effective in producing a skill and
chance orientation for the task, but that ''success" and
"failure" on the task had a strong effect on changing subjects' post-task opinions of how much skill or chance was.
involved.

Subjects who were told that the task was one of

skill initially rated the task accordingly, and of these
subjects only those who "failed" significantly changed their
ratings to indicate that more chance was involved,

Conversely,

subjects who.were told that the task was one of chance initially rated the task accordingly, and of these subjects
only those who "succeeded'' significantly changed their ratings to indicate that more skill was involved.
If skill

ca~

be related with personal control or internal

factors and chance'with no.personal control or external factors,
then these results appear to support Sobel (1974) who found
that success produced attribution to internal factors while
failure produced attribution to external factors.

In this

sense the present investigation lends support to the hypotheses
that success leads to increased internal control and failure
to increased external control.

If subjects' ratings of the

amount of skill (personal control) or chance (no personal
control) they felt was involved in the task could be considered as a measure

~f

control orientation, then the results

of these ratings as presented here support these hypotheses.
This "measure of control orientation" although initially
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biased by task instructions, does have the advantage of being
more situation specific and subjective than such a measure
as the Rotter I-E scale.

These situation-specific, subjec-

tive ratings thus may have been more sensitive to fluxuations in control orientation than the standardized measure.
The relative insensitivity of the Rotter scale was discussed
here earlier as a major criticism of the present inv:estigation.

Use of the skill or chance ratings in this study

thus provides some support for the use of situation-specific,
subjective measures of control orientation in locus of control research, either as the major indicator of subjects'
locus of control or as a "check" on the standardized measures
which

~re

broader in scope.

Still another way to view the results of these skill
or chance ratings is to consider the tendency for subjects
to accept credit for success and avoid responsibility for
failure.

This notion receives some support in the locus

of control literature that examines the influence of success
and failure as variables having different effects on individuals designated as "internals" and "externals."

These

studies suggest that differences exist between internals
and externals in their tendencies to accept responsibility
for success and failure (Davis and Davis, 1972; Lefcourt,
et al, 1975; Gilmore and Monton, 1974; Kaiser, 1975: Kravetz,

1974), their tendencies to change levels of confidence following experiences of success or failure (Feather, 1968;
Ryckman and Rodda, 1971.; Ryckman, et al, 1971), and their
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tendencies to respond either defensively (Phares, 1971;
Phares and Lamiell, 1971) or forgetfully (Efran, 196)) to
experiences of failure.

While the present investigation

does not differentiate between "internals" and "exte.rnals,

11

the orientation of individuals to internal and external
situations did occur when biased task instructions were given.

The effect of these internal and external situations on

subjects could likely have been one so as to produce a ."situa tion-specific internal" who refused to take credit for
failure and a ''situation-specific external

11

who took credit

for success.
As discussed earlier, the present investigation does.
not differentiate between subjects who indicated extreme internal or external control orientation on the Rotter I-E
scale.

This fact, when viewed against the mass of litera-

ture that points out differences between individuals with
such opposing orientations, would seem to be a major criticism of the present study.

Random assignment of subjects

to each experimental group served as a control for equal
distribution of such individuals among groups, but their
presence in the study's overall population may have easily
confounded the results by enabling a cancellation of effects
to occur.

For example, extreme internal and external post-

task responses by subjects in any one treatment group may
have cancelled each other out leaving a mean overall response for that group indicative of no change in control or-·
ientation when compared with pre-task scores.

Such, of course,
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incrm.ses the possibility of Type II error.

Future research

might improve over the present design by limiting subject
population to those only with median scores of control orientation on the pre-task administration of the Rotter I-E
scale.
A

fourth .. within the design" issue involves the task.

motivation of subjects.

The problem here is in how

impor~

tant or interesting the task was to a subject, and how important it was that he or she do well on the task.

It

would seem that degrere of success or failure in a task situation would, have little effect on subjects to whom that
situation was of little interest or importance, while those
more involved or interested would experience those effects
to a greater degree.

To check the task motivation level

of those who participated in the present investigation subjects were asked to rate how important the task, and doing
well on the task, was to them.
Analysis of the data for subjects' ratings of how important the task was to them revealed that subjects did not
differ significantly in their responses to this rating
question.

That.the general importance of' the task was

consistent across all

groups _.of.

subjects seems to in-

dicate that the confounding effects that would result from
subjects having different levels of task motivation need
not be of concern in this investigation.

The amount of im-

portance subjects attached to the task may, however, be
more of a concern

when~iewing ~he

overall results.

Task
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importance ratings were recorded on a seven point scale
ranging from "not important" to "important" and group

rat~

ings fell somewhere between 3.7 and 5.0 on that scale.
Such apparently indicates at least some small, degree of
task importance, but the extent of this importance seems
questionable in terms of the effects control, no control,·
success, or failure would have on a
only somewhat important.

~ituation

considered

It stands to reason that the

greater the importance of the task or the more that was
at stake personally for subjects, the better would be the
context for ·evaluating the effects of the main variables
·under investigation.

This higher level of task motivation

was not achieved in the present lab setting.

Future re-

search efforts may do well to provide task situations, perhaps in-vivo,

wh~ch

might first meet the criteria of im-

portance or higher motivation.

Such tasks may not need to

be the same for all subjects as long as their ratings of
task importance for the various tasks were consistent.

The

cateriti;oftask situations for subjects may present more dificulties than improvements, but certainly is an interesting
research possibility.
Analysis of the data for subjects' ratings of how important it was that they do well on the task revealed that
the skill oriented groups attached a significantly greater
importance to doing well than those chance oriented.
seems to indicate that doing well on the task was more

Such
im~

portant to those who were informed that their personal ef-
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forts or abilities were necessary for success.

In other

words, putting the responsibility for task success on one's
personal efforts seemed to increase their motivation to do
well on the task.

As was the case with ratings of task im-

portance, these ratings of importance to do well on the task
indicated only a small degree of importance to do well, even
for the skill oriented groups.

Again, raising the importance

attached to doing well on a task should be a focus of followup research in this area.
Another "within the design" issue of concern when viewing the results .of the present investigation involves subjects' task performance expectancy.

The expectancy a par-

ticular subject had in regards to their performance on the
task is an important concern here especially when considering the effects of SU(:cess and failure feedback (r:;.urin and
Gurin, 1970).

Individuals expecting to do poorly on a task,

for example, may be more affected by a success experience
than those .expecting to do well on that task.

Thus exper-

iences of success or failure may have different effects on
individuals depending on their expectancy levels such that
success would mean more to one with a low expectation to do
well or failure would have more of an effect on one who expects to do very well.

Ratings supplied by subjects par-

ticipating in the present study on how well they thought
they would do on the task indicate that those who were to
receive feedback indicative of success or failure were consistent in these ratings.

There was no statistically sig-
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nificant difference between ratings given by those in the
success and failure groups.

Actual expectancy ratings for

all groups ranged from J.6 to 4.6 on a seven point scale,
indicating no gross expectations to do very poorly or very
well on the task.

It is not possible based on the data to

draw conclusions on the effects of subjects' expectation .
levels in this study, aside from the fact that expectation
levels for all subjects were not extreme and therefore the
effects were probably minimal.
Conclusion and Implications of the Present Research
The present investigation has explored variables which
might be responsible for effecting change in individuals'
locus of control orientations.

Previous research in this

area has indicated that while the factors underlying such
change appear related to experiences o.f situations in which
one has or does not have personal control, the experiences
of success or failure in, or independent of, those situations
might also be important factors.

Results of this study in-

dicate that significant interactive effects indeed do exist
between locus of control orientation and successful performance in task situations with varying amounts of personal
control.
of

t~at

'l'hese results, while leaving the specific nature
interaction somewhat obscure, do support the im-

portance of the variables involved and suggest the need for
further research on their effects.

The present research

effort thus represents a somewhat successful attempt to
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establish factors responsible for effecting change in
individuals' constructions of control.

To date research

in this area has been relatively void of studies specifically designed to explore such factors.
thus

e~tablishes

itself

a~

The present study

an impbrtant link in the chain of

research which has examined locus of control

modificatio~.

Such importance must not be based on the ability, or inahility as it may be, of this investigation to delineate
specific factors, but on its role in substantiating factors
involved in effecting the modification of control orientations which.were suggested, in previous research,; and. in the
generating of data to be

us~d

in future research.

In its role of generating valuable data for future research the present investigation appears to carry implications for areas having a direct influence or effect on individuals' lives.

One such area is individual or group ther-

apies where an increased internal locus of control is often
considered a goal of the theraputic effort (Singer, 1965;
Lefcourt, 1972).

A recognition and understanding of

~pecif

ic factors which are involved in modifying one's control orientations would possibly aid therapists in extablishing
treatment interventions for their clients.

Another area of

implication is in the school setting where "internal or ''external" views would seem readily affected by the emphasis
placed on success and failure, and the varying amounts of
control students are given in the classroom.
ing of the effects these variables

An understand-

have,~either

independently
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or in combination with each other, may

encour~ge

classroom

changes such as a shift in emphasis away from grades as a
measure of success or failure, or a change in the way a
student receives instructions for an assignment to indicate greater or lesser amounts of personal control.

Still

another area of implication is minority or disadvantaged
groups.

While internal or external shifts may have dif-

ferent meanings or advantages amongst social groups (Gurin,
et al, 1969; Gurin and Gurin, 1970), an understanding of
factors that might influence any control orientation change
may prove important in this area as well.

Still another

area to benefit from continued research on factors influencing control orientation is the work setting.

Employers

might do well to grant their employees increased or decreased personal,control over various aspects of their job
and to re-evaluate the emphasis placed on job success or
failure.
In discussine implications of the present research a
final point should be made.

The present investigation,

while exploring variables which might influence the modification of individuals' locus of control orientations,
does not imply whether such change should be in an "internal" or "external" direction.

Rotter's (1975) point that

researchers should guard against a "good-bad guy" dichotomy seems well founded.

It has been the sole purpose of

this study to explore factors influencing an orientation
change in either direction.

While an understanding of
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these factors would suggest the possibility of purposely
modifying such orientations in various settings, the
directionality of that change certainly becomes an issue
in need of further research clarification.
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INFORMED CONSENT SHEET
The purpose of this information and consent sheet is
to provide you, the subject voluntarily involved in this
study, with a basic understanding of what will occur during your participation in this investigation.
The procedures involved in this study will include
your participation in choosing one out of two statements
which best represents your views. The purpose of this is
to gather data on your thoughts, feelings, and opinions.
Questions asked are not considered to be about very personal issues but are relatively mild in content. Your par·ticipation will also include involvement in a simple task
situation which will take place at least two weeks after
answering initial questions. Thus there will be two parts
to your participation, the first of about 15 minutes duration and the second taking about JO to 45 minutes. There
will be an opportunity for you to ask the experimenter any
queutions concerning the procedures used or other aspects
of the research.
Except to the experimenter, your participation will be
anonymous and any specific data you provide will be held
confidential. Data you provide will be recorded and all
answer sheets will then be destroyed. Recorded data will
not identify you in any way and will be used only in analyzing the results of this study.
Your signature on this document will indicate that
your participation in this research is voluntary, that you
may withdraw from participation at anytime, and that you
may choose to restrict the investigator from using data obtained as a result of your taking part in the experimental
proc.edures. Your signature in no way implies waiving of
your legal rights,
Signed~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Da te_·~~~~~~

(APPENDIX II)
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(ROTTER I-E SCALE: MODIFIED)
INSTRUCTIONS: The following is a list of 24 items. Each
item contains an a" and a "b" statement. Read both statements and choose which one is closest to the way you feel
now. You must circle either "a" or "b" for each item.
11

1 a Children get into trouble becru1ue their parents punish

them too much.
b The trouble with mcist children nowadays is that their
parents are too easy with them.
2 a Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly
due to bad luck.
b People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.

J a In the long run people get the respect they deserve in
this world.
b Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.

4 a The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
b Most students don't realize the P.xtent to which their
grades are influenced by accidental happenings.

S

a Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
b Capable people wh6 fail to become leaders have not taken
advantage of their opportunities.

6 a No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
b People who can't get others to like them don't understand
how to get along with others.

7 a Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality.
b It is one's experiences in life which determine what
they're like.

8 a I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
b Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as
making a decision to take a definite course of action.
9 a In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely
if ever such a thing as an unfair test.
b Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to
course work that studying is really useless.
10 a Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has
little or nothing to do with it.
b Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right
place at the right ~ime.
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11 a When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make
them work.
b It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many
things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune
anyhow.
12 a There are certain people who are just no good.
b There is some good in every body.
lJ a In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to

do with luck.
b Many times we might just as well decide what to do by
flipping a coin.

14 a Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky
enough to be in the right place first.
b Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability,
luck has little or nothing to do with it.

15 a Most people don't realize the extent to which their
lives are controlled by accidental happenings.
b There really is no such thing as "luck."

16 a One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
b It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.

17 a It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes
you.
b How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are. '
18 a In the long run the bad things that happen to us are
balanced by the good ones.
b Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.
19 a Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the
grades they give.
b There is a direct connection between how hard I study
and the grades I get.
20 a A good leader expects people to decide for thems·elves
what they chould do.
b A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their
jobs are.
21 a Many times I feel that I have little influence over
the things that happen to me.
b It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck
plays an important role in my life.
22 a People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
b There's not much use in trying too hard to please people,
if they like you, they like you.
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23 a There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.
b Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
24 a What happens to me is my own doing.
b Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over
the direction my life is taking.

PLEASE RATE: How has the day been for you so far today?
VERY BAD 1

2

J

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 VERY GOOD

(APPENDIX III)
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TASK INSTRUCTION SHEET
(control group)
Instructions:
The following is a task oriented study involving paired word associations. You will be given a short description of a person followed by a list of 10 words. Your task
is to \'Trite in the blank next to each word the one word you.
think the person described above associated with it when he
or she was asked. You will be asked to do this for three
trials, each trial consisting of a different person's desciption followed by 10 words. Again, your task is to determine what word that person paired with the given word.
After each trial of 10 words please stop and inform
the uxp~rimenter that you have completed that trial. The
experimenter will collect the task answer sheet, evaluate
your responses, and return the answer sheet to you for the
next ~rial.
Preliminary guestions:
Before proceeding, please answer the following questions.
1) Does this task involve skill or chance?
2
4
(SKILL) 1
J
5

6

7 (CHANCE)

2) How important is this task to you?
2
4
( NO'r IMPORTANT) 1
3

6

7 (IMPORTANT)

5

J) How important is it that you do well on this taslc?
2
4
{NOT IMFOHTANT) 1
6
3
7 (IMPORTANT)
5

4) How well do you think you will do on this task?
2
(VERY POORLY) 1
4
6
J
7 (VERY WELL)
5

(APPENDII IV)
TASK INSTRUCrION SHEET
(skill groups)
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Instructions:
The following is a task oriented study involving your
skill in determining paired word associations made by another
person. You will be given a short description of a person
followed by a list of 10 words. Your task is to write in
the blru1k next to each word the one word you think the person described above associated with it when he or she was
asked. You will be asked to do this for three trials, each
trial consisting of a different person's description followed
by 10 words. Again, your task is to determine what word that
person paired with the given word.
Success, or being able to correctly determine the word
associations made by the persons described, depends on two
factors. First, the associations have some logical connection. Second, and most important, it is suprising how.much
your "clinical sensitivity" to the individual descriptions
given here can lead to correctly determining their responses.
Thus success on this task involves your personal skills and
"clinical sensitivity."
After each t~ial of 10 words please stop and inform
the experimenter that you have completed that trial. The
experimenter will collect the task answer sheet, evaluate
your responses, and return the answer sheet to you for the
next trial.
Prel:\.r.)linqry questions:
Before proceeding, please answer the following questions.
1) Docs this task involve skill or chance?
2
(SKILL) 1
4
6
7 (CHANCE)
J
5
2) How important is this task to you?
2
4
(NOT IMPORTANT) 1
6
7 (IMPORTANT)
J
5
J) How important is it that you do well on this task?
2
4
(NOT IMPORTANT) 1
6
J
7 (IMPORTANT)
5
4) How well do you think you will do on this task?
(VERY POORLY) 1
2
J
4
5
6
7 (VERY WELL)

( APPErn) IX V)
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TASK INSTRUCTION SHEET
(chance groups)
Instructions:
The following is a task oriented study involving chance
quessing of paired word associ~tions made by another person.
You will be given a rhort description of a person followed
by a list of 10 words. Your task is to write in the blank
next to each word the one word you think the person described
above associated with it when he or she was asked. You will
be asked to do this for three trials, each trial consisting
of a different person's description followed by 10 words.
Again, your task is to determine what word that person paired with the given word.
lt!hile the word associations made by the persons descibed have some logical connection to the given words, your being able to 6orrectly guess the word they responded with
would be a matter of luck. Thus success on this task would
be due to chance and out of your control.
After each trial of 10 words please stop and inform the
experimenter that you have completed that trial. The experimenter will collect the task answer sheet, evaluate your
responses, and return the answer sheet to you for the next
trial.
Preliminarx guestions:
Before proceeding, please answer the following questions.
1) Does this task involve skill or chance?
2
4
(SKILL) 1
6
7 (CHANCE)
J
5
2) How important is this task to you?
4
(NOT I~PORTANT) 1
2
6
J
7 (IMPORTANT)
5
J) How important is it that you do well on this task?
4
(NOT IMPORTANT) 1
6
7 (IMPORTANT)
3
?
5
4) How well do you think you will do on this task?
4
(VEHY POORLY) 1
2
6
J
7 (VERY WELL)
5
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VI)
TASK ANSWER SHEET
(control and no feedback groups)
*Please stop after each trial and info.rm the experimenter.*
(APPENDL~

TRIAL 1
Descript~on:

Person X - (Doctor, Surgeon, J8 years old, aggressive, short tempered, heavy social drinker, sports
enthusiast).

1 red:
2 love:

J sick:
4 round:
5 life:

6
7
8
9
10

sharp:
play:
laugh:
person:
glass:

TRIAL 2
Description: ·Person Y - (Experienced grade-school teacher,
energ8tic, kind natured but strict, widow, attends church,
member league of women voters).
1 book:
2 white:

3 children:
4 hE::aven:
5 hate:

table:
water:
pencil:
right:
10 death:
6
7
8
9

TRIAL 1
Description: Person Z - (Jazz musc1c1an, poet, independent
thinker, mild tempe.rment 'but frequently depressed, single,
unsociable but friendly).
.
1 write:
2 time:
3 blue:
4 anger:
5 night:

6 music:
7 down:
8 flower:
9 money:
10 feel:

(APPENDTX VII)
TASK ANSWER SHEET
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(feedback groups)
*Please stop after each trial and in form the experimenter.*

TRIAL 1
Description: Person X - (Doctor, surgeon, 38 years old, aggressive, short tempered, heavy social drinker, sports
enthusiast).
1 red:
6 sharp: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
2 love:
7 play=~~------
8 laugh=-~-------~
3 sick:
4 round:
9 person: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
10 glass: __________
5 life:
'rhe average score for others on this trial was 47% correct·.
You got~__correct which shows
performance in comparison.

TRIAL 2
Descriptionr Person Y - (Experienced grade~school teacher,
energetic, kind natured but strict, widow, attends church,
member league of women voters).
1 book:
6 table:
7 waters ---------~
2 white: ---------8 pencil: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
3 children: _ _ _ _ __
~---------~

4 heaven=-----'----5 hate=--------

9 right: ___ - - - - - -

10 death=~----------~
The average score for others on this trial was 52% correct.
You got _ _ correct which shows
performance in comparison.

TRIAL J_
Description: Person Z - (Jazz muscician, poet, independent
thinker, mild temperment but frequently depressed, single,
unsociable but friendly).
1 write :
fr music:
2 time:
7 down:
8 flower:
3 blue:
4 anger:
9 money:
10 feel:
5 night:
The average score for others on this trial was 51% correct.
You got___correct which shows
performance in comparison.
----------~
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(APPENDIX VIII)
FINAL TASK QUESTION
(all groups)
Please answer the following question.

5l Does this task involve skill.or chance?
(SKILL) 1

2

J

4

5

6

7 (CHANCE)

(APPENDIX IX)
DEBRIEFING SHEET
The experiment in which you have participated actually
involved more than the word association task. Briefly, this
was a study on the effects of 1) being involved in a task
situation of skill or chance and 2) either succeeding or
failing on that task. The study explored how these effects
might influence people's ideas of the world around them as.
being one in which things happen as a result of personal efforts or as a result of good or bad luck.
Because of random experimental procedures you may or
may not have been involved in being told that the task was
one of skill or chance. If you were, this was not actually
true. In reality the task could be viewed as either. You
may also have been one who was told you did very well
very
poorly on the task. In reality no answers were evaluated.
The described persons were all fictitious so' success or fail-.
ure was impossible. 'The tests taken before and after the
task. which you may have noticed were the same, were to help
the experimenter determine your views on how much luck and
personal effort is involved in the world. These views will
be held confidential from others.

or

If you have any questions please feel free to ask the
experimenter. Please know that your time and efforts have
been greatly appreciated and are of value.
It is requested, however, that you not discuss the experiment with anyone. If future participants know or find
out this information experimental results will be false,
and also your time and efforts wasted.

THANK-YOU AGAINl
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APPENDIX X

ANALYSIS OF I-E SCORES

TABLE 1
I-E SCORE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS: TASK INSTRUCTION X TASK FEEDBACK X I-E SCORE TRIALS
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TABL~.<;

2
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Analysis of I-E Scores:
Task Instruction X Task Feedback X I-E Score Trials

Source of Variation

df

SS

119

1582.80

59

1420.80

Instruction

1

Feedback

MS

F

28.0J

28.0J

1.11

2

26.25

13.13

0.52

Instruction X Feedback

2

6.22

J.11

0.12

Subjects Within Groups
(error) ·

54

1360.30

25.19

Within Subjects

60

162.00

Trials

1

0.30

O.JO

0.12

Instruction X Trials

1

0.14

0 .1l~

0.06

Feedback X Trials

2

3.35

1.67

0.69

Instruction X Feedback
X Trials

2

28.Jl

14.16

5.90*

54

129.90

2.40

.Total
Between Subjects

Trials X Subjects
Within Groups (error)

*

P<4·05

TAii!.£ 3
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Analysis of I-E Scores:
Task Instruction·x No Feedback X I;_E Score .Trials
. Source of Variation
Total
Between Subjects
Instruction
Subjects Within Groups (error)
Within Subjects
Ttials
Instruction X Trials
Trials X Subjects
Wii;hin Groups (error)

df

SS

39

497.97
452.47
3.03

19
:t

MS

F

J.OJ
25.30

0.12
1.29

18
20

~55.50

1.

. }.OJ

1

0 •. 22

3.03
0 .. 22

18

42.25

2.35

45.50
0 .. 09

Table 4
Analysis of I-E Scores:
Task Instruction X Failure .X I-E Score Trials
Source of Variation

df

SS

MS

Total
Between Subjects
Instruction
Subjects Within Groups
(error)
.
Within Subjects
Trials
Instruction X Trials
Trials X Subjects
iv i thin Groups (error)

J9
19
1

495.60
439.10
25.60

25.60

18

14-l.J.50

22.97

20

56.5

F

1.11

1

o.oo

o.oo

o.oo

1

10 .10

10.10

J.90

18

46.40

2.58

TA!JLE 5
Analysis of I-E Scores:
Task Instruction X Success X I-E Score Trials
Source of Variance

df

Total
Between Subjects
Instruction
Subjects Within Groups
(error)
Within Subjects
Trials
Instruction X Trials
Trials X Subjects
Wi~hin Groups (error)

39

*p<..

SS

MS

19
1

487.48

18
20

481.85

26.77

1

75.50
0.63

0.63

1

18.22

18.22

18

56.65

3.15

5.63

81

F

0.21

0. 20
5.78*

.05

TABLE 6
Analysis of Pre-task I-E Scores:
Task Instruction X Success X I-E Score Trial 1
Source of Variation'

df

SS

Total
Instruction
Within Groups (error)

19
1

224.80
1.80

1.80

18

223.00

12.39

MS

F

0.14

TABLE 7
Analysis of Post-task I-E Scores:
Task Instruction X Success X I-E Score Trial 2
Source of Variation

df

SS

Total
Instruction
Within Groups (error)

19

342.55

1
18

22.05

22.05

320.50

17.81

MS

F

1.24

82

TABLE 8

Analysis of I-E Scores:
Skill X Success X I-E Sc-0re Trials
Source of Variation

df

SS

Total
Trials
Subjects
Trials X Subjects (error)

19

122.80
5.20
76.80
40.80

t

9
9

MS

5.20

F

1.14

4.53

TABLE 9
Analysis of I-E Scores:
Chance X Success X I-E Score Trials
Source of Variation

df

SS

Total
Trials
Subjects
Trials X Subjects (error)

19

4J4.55
6.05
405.05
23.45

1

9
9

MS

6.05

2.60

F

2.33

SJ

TABLE 10
I-E SCORE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS:
CONTROL GHOUP X I-E SCORE TRIALS
I-E SCORE TRIALS
POST-TASK
X
SD

PR1~-'rASK

X

SD

6.6

CONTROL GROUP

7.8

TABLE 11
Analysis of I-E Scores:
Control Group X I-E Score Trials
Source of Variation

df

SS

Total
Trials
Subjects
Trials X Subjects (error)

19

732.00
5.20
310.00
416.80

1

9
9

MS
5.20

46.20

F

0.11

APPENDIX XI
ANALYSIS OF DAY RATINGS.

TABLE 12
DAY RATING MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS: TASK INSTRUCTION X TASK FEEDBACK X RATING TRIALS

TASK FEEDBACK
NO
X

SD

SUCCESS
X
SD

FAILURE

X

· SD

er.,,

SKILL

.5. 6

1.3

6.8

1.9

6.9

1 . .5

0

CHANCE

6.6

2.9

7.6

. -~ 9

.

8.1

1.8

SKILL

5.9

1.9

6.9

2.0

6.9

2 • .3

CR'\HCE

6.7

2.0

7.8

1.5

6.5

2.5

z
H

8

TRIAL 1
(Pre-task rating)

~()

rn

<X:

:::J
~

88

rn
z
H

TRIAL 2
(Post-task rating)

B5

86
TABLE 13
Analysis of Day Rating:
Task Instruction X Task Feedback X Day Rating Trials

Source of Variation

df

SS

119

491.98

59

375.35

Instruetion

1

15.78

15.78

2.56

Feedback

2

25.97

12.98

2.11

Instruction X Feedback

2

1.60

o.s

0.13

Subjects Within Groups
(error)

54

332.00

Within Subjects

60

116.6)

Trials

1

0.76

0.76

0.39

Instruction X Trials,

1

2.54

2.54

1.32

Feedback X Trials

2

6.17

J.08

1.60

Instruction X Feedback
X Trials

2

4.04

2.02

1. 06

54

103 .12

1.91

Total
Between Subjects

Trials X Subjects
Within Groups (error)

MS

F

6.15

87

APPENDIX XII

ANALYSIS OF SKILL/CHANCE RATINGS·

TABLE 14
SKILL/CHANCE RATING MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS:
TASK INSTRUCTION X TASK FEEDBACK X RATING TRIALS

TASK FEEDBACK
NO

U2

z0

H

SUCCESS
X
SD

FAILURE
X
SD

X

SD

SKILL

4.4

1.J

.3. 3

1 .. 1

J.2

1.7

CHANCE

5.3

1.6

6.4

1.J

5,9

0.7

SKILL

4.2

1.9

3.1

0.9

5.4

1.7

CHANCE

5.4

1.6

4.6

1.8

5,7

1.J

8

TRIAL 1
{Pre-task rating).

~o

L') ;:::J
·~

0:::

88
U2

z

H

TRIAL 2
(Post-task rating)

88

89
TABLE 15
Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Task Instruction·x· Task Feedback X Skill/Chance Rating Trials

·source of Variation
Total

df

SS

MS

F

119

370. 89

59

265.50

Instruction

1

78.42

78.42

0.92

Feedback

2

10 .22.

5.11

0.06

Instruction X Feedback

2

8.03

4. 01

0.05

Subjects Within Groups
(error)

54

168.83

84.41

Within Subjects

60

105.39

Trials

1

0.02

0.02

0.02

Instruction x Trials

1

4.39

4.39

J.99*

Feedback X Trials

2

31. 01

15.50

14.09*

Instruction X Feedback
X Trials

2

10. LJ.1

5.20

4.72*

54

59,56

1.10

Between Subjects

Trials X Subjects
Within Groups (error)

*p~

• 05

90
rABLE 16
Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Task Instruction X Success X Skill/Chance Rating Trials
1

Source of Variation
Total
Between Subjects
.Instruction
Subjects Within Groups
(error)
Within Subjects
Trials
Instruction X Trials
Trials X Subjects
vJithin Groups (error)

df

SS

MS

J9
19
1

1.31 . 10
101 .10
.52 .18

.52.18

18
20
1
1

48.92
J2.00
10.00
7.12

10.00
7.12

18

14.88

o.BJ

F

19.18*

2.72
12.09*
8.61 *

*}).l...0.5
TABLE 17
Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating
Task Instruction x Failure X Skill/Chance Rating Trials
Source of Variation ,

df

SS

Total
Between Subjects
Instruction
Subjects Within Groups
·
(error)
Within Subjects
Trial a
Instruction X Trials
Trials X Subjects Within
Groups (error)

39
19

119.90
67.9

1

22.50

22.50
2.50

1

.5. 40
.52. 0
10.00
14.Lw

10.00
14 .lrn

18

27,60

1.53

*

p <. • 05

18
20
1

J}

MS

F

9.00*

6.5J*
9 .41 *
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TABLE 18
Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating
Task Instruction X No-Feedback X Skill/Chance Rating Trials
Source of Variation

df

SS

Total
Between Subjects.
Instruction
Subjects Within Groups
(error)
Within Subjects
Trials
Instruction X Trials .
Trials X Subjects
Within Groups (error)

39

107. 78
86.28
11.03

19

1
18

MS

11.03

4.18

20

75.25
21.50

1
1

O.OJ
0.22

O.OJ
0.22

18

56.65

J.15

F

2.64

0.01
0.07

TABLE 19
Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Task Instruction X Success X Pre-task Rating Trials
Source of Variation

df

Total
Instruction
Within Groups (error)

19

74.55

1

48.05

18

26.50

*p~

SS

92

MS

48.05
1.47

F

J2.69*

• 05

TABLE 20
Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Task Instruction X Success X Post-task Rating Trials
Source of Variation

df

Total
Instruction
Within Groups (error)

19

*pL..

1
18

SS

48.55
11.25
'.37. JO

MS

11.25
2. 07

F

5.4J*

.os
TABLE 21
Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Chance,X Success X Rating Trials

Source of Variation

df

Total
Trials
Within Groups (error)
*p ~. 05

19
1

18

SS

61.00
16.20
4.4. 80

MS

16.20
2.40

F

6.51*

TABLE 22

Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Skill X Success X Rating Trials
Source of Variation

df

Total
Trials
Within Groups (error)

19
1

18

SS

19.20
0.02
19.00

MS

0.20
1. 06

F

0.19

TAl(LE

2J
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Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Task Instruction X Failure X Pre-task Rating Trials
Source of Variation

df

Total
Instruction
Within Groups (error)
* p I.. • 05

19
1

18

SS

66.95
36.45
30.50

F

MS

J6.45
1.69

21.57*

TABLE 24
Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Task Instruction X Failure X Post-task Rating Trials
Source of Variation

df

SS

Total
Instruction
Within Groups {error)

19

42.95

1

o.45

o.45

18

42.50

2.36

TABLE

MS

F

0.19

25

Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Skill X Failure X Rating Trials
SS

Source of Variation

df

Total
Trials
Within Groups (error)

19

76.20

1

24.20

24.20

18

52.00

2.89

*

MS

F

8.37*

p ( . 05

TABLE 26

Analysis of Skill/Chance Rating:
Chance X Failure X Rating Trials
Source of Variation

df

Total
Trials
Within Groups (error)

19

21.20

1

0.20

0.20

18

21.00

1.17

SS

MS

F

0.17

APPENDIX XIII
ANALYSIS OF TASK MOTIVATION RATING ClUESTION:
"HOW IMPORTANT IS THIS TASK TO YOU?"
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TABLE 2'(

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR RATING QUESTION,
"HOVJ IMPOR'rAHT IS THIS '1 ASK TO YOU?"
TASK INSTRUCTION X TASK FEEDBACK
1

TASK FEEDBACK
NO

FAILURE

SUCCESS

x

SD

x

SD

x

SKILL

4.1

1.1

5.0

1.2

4.8

1.2

CHANCE

!.~. 3

1.1

3.7

1.J

4.5

1.1

SD

z

0

H

8

::.::: Ll

UJ:::>

<

p::;

88
(/)

z
H

TABLE 28

Analysis of Rating Question
"Hovr important is this task to you?"
Task Instruction X Task Feedback
Source of Variation

df'

Total
Instruction
Feedback
Instruction X Feedback
Error

59

90.00

1
2

J.86

SS

MS

F

2.70

J.86
1.J5

2.66
0.93

2

5.?4

2.62

1.80

5/f.

78.20

1.l~5
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APPENDIX XIV
ANALYSIS OF TASK MOTIVATION RATING QUESTION:
"HOW IMPORTANT IS IT THAT YOU DO WELL ON THIS TASK?"
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TABLE 29
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOB RATING QUESTION,
''HOU IMPORTANT IS IT THAT YOU DO WELL ON THIS TASK?
TASK INSTRUCTION X rrASK FEEDBACK

11

TASK FEEDBACK

x

NO

SD

SUCCESS
X
SD

FAILURE
X

SD

4.9

1 .• 2

4 .• J

0.9

z

0

H

E-1

~(,)

SKILL

4.5

1.1

4.9

CHANCE

J.8

1.5

.3. 9

(/) :::>

c:i: p::
(-l

E-1
(/)

2.1

z

H

TABLE JO
Analysis of Rating Question,
''How important is it that you do well on this task?"
·Task Instruction X Task Feedback
Source of Variation

df

SS

Total
Instruction
Feedback
Instruction x Feedback
Error

59

124 .18

1
2

8.81

8.81

2.03

1. 01

4.21 *
o.48

2

o.44-

0.22

0.11

54

112.90

2.09

*

p (.. 05

MS

F
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APPENDIX XV
ANALYSIS OF TASK PERFORMANCE EXPEC'.l'ANCY QUESTION:
"HOW WELL DO YOU THINK YOU WILL DO ON THIS TASK? 11
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TABLE 31
MJ<.::ANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR RATING QUESTION,
"HOW WELL DO YOU THINK YOU WILL DO ON THIS TASK?"

TASK INSTRUCTION X TASK FEEDBACK

TASK FEEDBACK

NO

FAILURE

SUCCESS

x

SD

x

SD

x

SD

z

0

H

8
!::<:::U

SKILL

3.8

1.5

Lj.• 6

1.0

4.o

1.0

CHANCE

J.6

1.7

4.J

2.0

3.9

o.6

(/) :.::>

c:r: ~

88
(/)

z
H

TABLE 32

Analysis of Rating Question,
"How well do you think you will do on this task? ' 1
Task Instruction X Tas~ Feedback
SS

Source of Variation

df

Total
Instruction
Feedback
Instruction X Feedback
Error

59

26.93

1

0.59

2

5.83

2

0.10

_51~

20.40

*

p

L... • 05

MS

F

0.59
2.90

1.50
7.60*

0.52
0.38

0.14
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TABLE JJ.

Newman-Keuls Analysis for Specific Differences in Task Performance
Ratings for Task Feedback Groups
NO FEEDBACK

FAILURE

SUCCESS

3°95

4.45
0.75*

0.25

0.50

MS Within Groups Error = 0.38
Standard Error = 0.19
n == 10

.r

*

p ( • 05

q

2

2.84

3

J.41

cd

0.54
o.64

